better serves the purposes of the securities laws than the approach currently used by most lower courts.
Section I of this Comment discusses the basic elements of a fraud on the market case and explores the financial and economic bases of the theory. Section II reviews the significant cases that have addressed the fraud on the market theory, and examines the judicial approaches taken in these cases in light of the financial theories outlined in Section I. Finally, Section III details a more appropriate understanding of reasonable investor behavior in the IPO context, suggesting the factors which, if present, would make a market sufficiently efficient such that investor reliance would be reasonable.
I. THE FRAUD ON THE MARKET THEORY: ELEMENTS AND THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS
A. The 10b-5 Action Plaintiffs have had a private right of action under Rule 10b-5 since 1946." In order to recover under the Rule, the plaintiff must allege and prove as one of the elements of 10b-5 action that the defendant's misleading statement or omission made in connection with the purchase or sale of a security was, in fact, relied upon by the plaintiff in deciding whether to buy or sell the security. 8 When each individual's monetary damages are small relative to the costs of a suit, 10b-5 actions may take the form of class action suits.
The reliance requirement often acts to thwart a class action suit because, frequently, individual plaintiffs were unaware of the defendant's fraudulent statement (and thus could not claim to have relied upon it). The fraud on the market theory, however, helps to establish the reliance element for the entire plaintiff class. The basic logic behind it is that the defendant's misstatements or omissions affected the price of the security, thereby undermining the entire market.
B. Theoretical Underpinnings of the Fraud on the Market Theory
Courts find support for their acceptance of the fraud on the market argument in modern finance doctrine. 9 The most useful current theory is the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH). The ECMH asserts that an "information efficient" capital market will rapidly impound all available information into the price of any security.' 0 Accordingly, courts have used this hypothesis to justify the conclusion that the market price for a security in an information efficient market can be assumed to incorporate all relevant information about the security, including the defendant's misstatements or omissions."
Financial theorists have developed two explanations of the process by which a capital market is driven toward information efficiency. The first, the fundamental value theory, posits that current market prices are based on calculations of the economically "correct" values of securities. 2 The second, the expected price theory, postulates that current prices are based on investors' expectations of future prices. ' 3 The following sections analyze these doctrines in order to provide a basis for understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the case law, and to provide the theoretical underpinnings for the approach to Rule 10b-5 IPO cases proposed in Section III.
The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis.
The ECMH asserts that certain markets are information efficient: they quickly process public information and, as a result, current market prices reflect all public knowledge about a security. Doctrine, 44 Bus Law 1259 , 1266 -67 (1989 . The assumptions under which such an information efficient, ECMH market will exist are that (1) transaction costs are zero; (2) information is free to all interested parties; (3) all participants have the same time horizon (the period over which they consider information relevant); and (4) all participants have the same expectations about how prices will react to information. 15 Such conditions, however, exist only in theory, and are merely approximated in the real world. 16 Consequently, no market will be perfectly information efficient, 17 and the market price at any time will not reflect all available information. Still, courts and commentators have characterized those markets that most closely parallel the theoretical world. Such markets generally have (1) low transactions costs, (2) a number of skilled investors, (3) little evidence of superior performance by investment analysts, (4) high trading volume, (5) market makers and arbitragers, (6) required SEC registrain note 1). Contrast Macey, et al, 77 Va L Rev at 1022-24 (cited in note 10). This characterization of the ECMH reflects the "semi-strong" variant of the theory, the most widely accepted version of the ECMH and the one that appears to be the conceptual touchstone for courts adopting the fraud on the market theory. Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the Market Theory, 74 Cornell L Rev 907, 910-11 (1989) . See also Lone, Dodd, and Kimpton, The Stock Market at 65-73 (cited in note 1) (detailing empirical research). The "weak" form of the ECMH states that current prices reflect the historical patterns of a stock's price. The weak form is also well accepted and counsels against using technical analysis of price patterns as a method of selecting winning stocks. Lastly, the "strong" form of the ECMH asserts that the prevailing market price reflects privileged or insider information. The strong form, however, is not well accepted. Id at 76-77.
16 Lone, Dodd, and Kimpton, The Stock Market at 63 (cited in note 1). , 15 (1960) . " This imperfection helps to explain a paradox that emerges if the ECMH is taken at its face value. It would appear that because no amount of research can produce returns superior to those based on a random selection of securities, the incentive to undertake research does not exist. On the other hand, if no research is done, the market will not remain information efficient. However, this paradox is no different from that in other competitive markets. See Lorie, Dodd, and Kimpton, The Stock Market at 80-81 (cited in note 1), and Robert L. Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers 293-94 (Simon & Schuster, 6th ed 1986). Though competition tends to keep returns to an average level, entrepreneurs will nevertheless seek to exploit the occasional opportunity for abnormally high profits resulting from mistakes by their competitors. Lorie, Dodd, and Kimpton, The Stock Market at 77, 80-81 (cited in note 1). While the ECMH would suggest that abnormal returns are rare, it is consistent with the empirical conclusion that some inefficiency exists. Wang, 19 UC Davis L Rev at 401-02 (cited in note 12); Macey, et al, 77 Va L Rev at 1029 (cited in note 10). In fact, Lorie and his coauthors state that the conclusions regarding the ECMH apply only "on average," and that better analysts can still gain substantial economic rents (above-average profits). Lorie, Dodd, and Kimpton, The Stock Market at 77 (cited in note 1). tion, and (7) a causal relation between new information and price movements. I s 2. Two possible explanations of efficient capital markets.
The ECMH is a descriptive theory. The ECMH asserts only that a market price quickly incorporates all relevant information; it does not explain what information is relevant to this market price or why the price changes in response to the information. An ongoing debate exists as to the types of information that are important to a security's price, and the way in which prices react to such information. As Section II will detail, many courts expect markets that approximate the ECMH model to generate prices that reflect the "true," intrinsic value of a security. 9 This thinking is based on the fundamental value model. However, ECMH information efficiency does not necessarily imply that prices are always accurate reflections of the intrinsic value of a security. For instance, information unrelated to the issuer's future financial performance may also affect prices. The market could then be information efficient, though not value efficient. The Keynesian "beauty contest," which suggests that stock prices reflect expectations about future prices in addition to the security's intrinsic value, is consistent with this situation.
a) The fundamental value theory. The fundamental value theory states that, given enough information about a security, an analyst can calculate one "true" price for it. Prices are conceptualized as the discounted present value of the future earnings (dividends, interest or principal payments, liquidation values, etc.) of the security. 20 An analyst develops certain expectations about these future cash flows upon which to base an estimate of the fundamental value of the stock. New information about the security will change the analyst's estimate of this value, and hence the analyst's estimate of the stock's price. 2 theory, analysts act as market arbitragers, buying or selling stock in response to new information. They act to take advantage of the perceived difference between the value of the security based on "old" information and the new expected value. The quicker an analyst moves, the greater the differential between the pre-and postinformation prices, and the greater the profit. 22 Thus, the analyst's belief that securities have a discoverable fundamental value would create incentives that explain why the ECMH works. 23 A major drawback to the fundamental value theory is that it requires a great deal of specific, sometimes unobtainable, information. Determining future cash flows involves analysis of present operations, future growth rates, relative risk levels, and the future levels of interest rates. 24 Analysts cannot precisely ascertain future events and consequently cannot calculate a security's "exact" value. 25 The price that results from the analysts' efforts is thus not necessarily accurate, but is simply a collective estimate of the value of the stock based on individual analysts' expectations. 2 True value efficiency remains elusive.
b) The expected price theory and the "beauty contest." The expected price model, an alternative explanation of why the market price incorporates public information, illustrates more clearly why value efficiency is a questionable proposition. This model is derived from Keynes's "beauty contest" analogy. 7 The "beauty contest" looks to the psychology of the market, positing that prices are based not on fundamental value, but instead on what an investor believes she will receive for the security at a later time. 28 Of course, the expected price model may incorporate aspects of the fundamental value model. For example, expected future prices may depend on estimates of future cash flows. The dif-"' Lorie, Dodd, and Kimpton, The Stock Market at 82 (cited in note 1). Any difference between the trading price and actual "value" of the security would create a "money machine" which investors in any well-functioning capital market would take advantage of and thereby eliminate. When a court requires value efficient pricing to establish a fraud on the market claim, 30 it is not surprising that the court also requires the presence of a sophisticated market. Only under such circumstances would the marketplace approximate value efficiency. As we have seen, however, value efficiency is a dubious proposition and information efficiency is a much more defensible one.
Thus, an important distinction must be kept in mind when thinking about the prices of securities. The widely-accepted ECMH is concerned with "information efficiency": whether all available information is incorporated into the price of the stock. The fundamental value model, a far more controversial proposition, concerns "value efficiency": whether the price of the security accurately represents its "value" at any point in time. 3 '
II. THE FRAUD ON THE MARKET THEORY IN CASE LAW
Courts have gradually accepted the fraud on the market doctrine over the course of the last fifteen years.
3 2 Although the original purpose of the doctrine was to further the disclosure goals of the securities laws, 3 3 courts have since narrowed the application of the doctrine and have applied it only to markets that are highly 35 even though the disclosure goals of securities regulation would be furthered by allowing such claims. Section II illustrates this misguided trend away from the original purposes of the doctrine and toward a more technical approach in the context in which the trend developed: 10b-5 cases involving securities traded on large national exchanges. This Section also shows that this trend has unfortunately carried over into the IPO context, in which the courts' preference for this flawed technical analysis makes a critical difference.
A. The Courts' Acceptance of the Fraud on the Market Theory The Ninth Circuit was the first federal appellate court to adopt the fraud on the market theory. In Blackie v Barrack, 3 6 the court certified a 10b-5 class action suit, allowing the plaintiffs to satisfy the reliance element through use of the fraud on the market theory. The court stated that in the "impersonal stock exchange context" the causal connection between the defendants' wrongdoing and the plaintiffs' losses could be satisfied through reliance on market price. 7 In so holding, the court expressly focused on the purposes of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The Ninth Circuit stated that the 1934 Act and the SEC regulations promulgated thereunder, including Rule 10b-5, "are designed to foster an expectation that securities markets are free from fraud-an expectation on which purchasers should be able to rely. s 3 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that if a defendant has artificially altered the price of a security through "unsuspected manipulation," the defendant has affected the investor's decision of whether or not to purchase the security. 3 9 The investor may have been more or less willing to purchase the security had the price been different.
After Blackie, the Second Circuit was the next to accept the fraud on the market doctrine. 40 (1982) . The court in Panzirer mirrored the Blackie court in presuming that material misrepresentations would affect the market price of the security. Like the began to overlook the purposes of the securities laws, and instead to concentrate on a technical analysis of information efficiency. In Lipton v Documation, Inc., 4 1 the defendant corporation, whose stock was traded on an open market, disseminated false financial reports and its officers made statements claiming earnings while knowing that the company had actually suffered significant losses. The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged the need to advance the purposes of the securities laws, 4 2 and properly took note of the importance of the fact that the security's price reflected available information. But in discussing the information efficiency of the market, the court also emphasized-improperly-the existence of a highly efficient secondary market in which the security was actively and openly traded. 4 3 The court felt that in such a market it was plausible to assume that the misinformation directly affected the price and, as a result, the causal nexus between the misinformation and the decision to purchase was more direct." 4 However, the court expressed doubt as to whether a plaintiff could reasonably rely on the market to process the information in the primary or new issues market, in which a rigorous form of information efficiency did not inhere. 4 5 In Peil v Speiser, 4 6 the Third Circuit drifted even farther from Blackie's focus on the purposes of the securities laws. The class action plaintiffs, purchasers of stock trading on the American Stock Exchange, alleged that exaggerations of expected earnings artificially inflated the stock's market price, thus inducing them to make a losing investment. 47 The court, however, did not focus directly upon the plaintiffs reliance on the defendants' fraudulent actions. Rather, it emphasized the plaintiff's reliance "on the marketplace's reflection of the value of the stock. ' 48 The court noted that such reliance is appropriate in "open and developed" markets, such as the active secondary market in the case, precisely because the price of the stock in such situations "is determined by the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit stated that in the context of the case, the plaintiffs could reasonably rely on the market to "validly set" a price for the security in an environment free from "unsuspected fraud." Id at 368. 41 available material information regarding the company and its business." '4 9 Apparently, the court in Peil incorrectly construed presumed reliance as requiring a value efficient market. The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits continued this trend.
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These later decisions, which incorporated a restrictive and technically flawed interpretation of the ECMH, formed part of the basis of the Supreme Court's 1988 decision in Basic. In Basic, the Court was willing to uphold the lower court's certification of a class in a 10b-5 case, in part because the security was traded in an efficient market.
5 1 The Court unfortunately quoted passages from the earlier decisions (discussed above) that had erroneously equated the instantaneous incorporation of information with security prices that reflect fundamental values. 52 These references, then, reflect a distorted conception of the market as one in which price accurately reflects the fundamental value of a security. 5 While Basic's holding was sound on its facts and did not address IPOs, its reference to "value efficiency" has since led lower courts astray. These courts have read Basic as supporting their incorrect analyses of what constitutes a sufficiently efficient IPO market. 8' The Supreme Court's analysis of market efficiency is confusing. While the Court required an efficient market, the Court also explicitly refused to establish some standard by which to evaluate the timeliness of the market's adjustment to the information, which is one of the best indicators of the information efficiency of the market. See Basic, 485 US at 248 n 28.
See Freeman, 915 F2d at 197-98 (citing Basic to support its conclusion that efficiency requires the market price of a security to be "an accurate reflection of its worth"); 
B. Fraud on the Market in Actions Involving Initial Public Offerings of Securities
Early IPO cases correctly looked to the purposes of the securities laws in fashioning broad remedies under Rule 10b-5. Later courts, perhaps confused by decisions involving securities heavily traded in secondary markets, have mimicked the trend in these secondary market cases away from furthering the purposes df the securities laws, toward focusing on a rigorous ECMH market and value efficiency. In the IPO context, market prices may respond sufficiently to information even though the market will never be perfectly information efficient. Consequently, a court's demand that an IPO market closely approximates the assumptions for information efficiency inherent in the ECMH will, as a practical matter, eliminate IPO class action claims based on the fraud on the market theory.
Non-efficiency approaches to 10b-5 cases involving IPOs.
Some circuits have allowed plaintiffs to use arguments not based on information efficiency to establish the reliance element in a 10b-5 action. These cases have usually involved palpable misconduct by the defendant. Regrettably, courts have construed this line of cases narrowly.
In Shores v Sklar, 55 the Fifth Circuit first allowed the use of the fraud on the market theory to establish reliance for a Rule 10b-5 claim in the context of an IPO. The plaintiffs in Shores were purchasers of industrial park bonds who alleged that various misrepresentations had inflated the value of the bonds. 6 The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the plaintiffs had been unaware of the misrepresentation at the time of the purchase. The Fifth Circuit vacated the decision and remanded the case. 57 Specifically, the Fifth Circuit found that the securities laws were enacted not only to ensure full disclosure, but also to promote "free and honest markets," to protect investors, to promote ethical standards of honesty, and to instill confidence in securities markets. 8 A narrow interpretation of the laws, the court concluded, would not achieve these broader purposes. 5 e To help establish the degree to which the misrepresentations undermined the integrity of the market, the court further stated that had fraud not been involved, the securities could not have been offered on the market at any price. 0 Using a similar approach, the Tenth Circuit responded to the IPO situation by allowing a cause of action if the securities were issued unlawfully; that is, if they were not issued in strict compliance with securities laws. The decision in T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v Fort Cobb, Okla. Irrigation Fuel Authority founded its reasoning on the plaintiffs' right to rely on the integrity of the securities regulatory process.6 e
The decisions in Shores and T.J. Raney were based upon the broad, remedial purposes of securities laws. Ironically, subsequent courts have relied on these cases to justify a highly restrictive approach to the fraud on the market theory in IPO cases. For instance, when the Fifth Circuit revisited the issue in Abell v Potomac Ins. Co., the court, ignoring its earlier discussion of the purposes of the securities laws, relied on Shores in stating that if the plaintiffs could not establish the efficiency of the market in question, they had to show that the securities they purchased were not marketable at all. 6 2 The court first concluded that the market for bonds issued to finance construction of a home for the mentally retarded was not an active secondary market, and was thus not information efficient.
6 3 Therefore, reliance could only be established under the Shores "totally unmarketable" rationale. 4 The court then decided that because the bonds always had some legitimate value, they were entitled to be marketed. 65 In short, the Fifth Circuit effectively required that a security be entirely worthless before the fraud on the market theory would apply in the IPO con-"' Id at 464 (asserting that the securities laws encompass all "deliberate, manipulative schemes to defraud which can annul not only the purpose of disclosure but also the market's honest function").
40 Id at 464 n 2. The Shores court appears to have ignored the fact that any security, no matter how risky, has some value on the market. See Fischel, text, a condition that very rarely holds true in real world situations.
The result in Abell is typical of those found in district court cases that consider non-market efficiency approaches. 6 Once the analysis focuses on such approaches, very few plaintiffs can show that a security is totally worthless, or was issued in violation of securities regulations. This anti-investor result is contrary to the original broad and remedial purposes underlying the Rule 10b-5 action.
2. ECMH analysis of 10b-5 claims involving IPOs.
Plaintiffs in IPO cases have also met with little success in attempts to establish reliance using the ECMH. The Sixth Circuit recently expressed the general judicial attitude to fraud on the market claims involving IPOs. In Freeman v Laventhol & Horwath, the court refused to allow the plaintiffs, holders of over $18 million in tax exempt municipal bonds, to use the fraud on the market theory to establish reliance for the purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action. e On its facts, however, Freeman appeared to be fairly well-suited to a fraud on the market claim: the active market for the securities included over one thousand investors and numerous underwriters and securities brokers. 6 Yet the court held that the market did not satisfy its stringent requirements, and upheld summary judgment for the defendants. 6 " Although the court properly recognized that in an ECMH market the price of the security reflects all available information, the court confused this insight with value efficiency, stating that "[i]nvestors rely on the price of the security as an accurate reflection of its worth. ' ' 70 66 See, for example, Stinson v Van Valley Development Corp., 719 F Supp 362, 366-67, aft'd, 897 F2d 524 (3d Cir 1990). It is not surprising that most securities are found to have some value. Securities represent a claim to a future cash flow. As long as there is some probability, no matter how low, that some payment, no matter how small, will be made on the claim, the security has some value.
67 193, 199 (6th Cir 1990 n 17, in deciding that the market was insufficiently efficient. In Cammer, the court asserted that "a developed market will almost always be an open one. And an efficient market will almost invariably be a developed one." According to the Cammer court, such a market exists when the conditions which characterize ECMH information efficiency prevail. See note 18 and accompanying text. The current approach to fraud on the market cases is flawed in two related ways: the courts overrely on the fundamental value theory in characterizing the ECMH, and underrely on the information efficiency of markets for IPOs. The manner in which the courts apply the ECMH is problematic because courts often fail to distinguish between value efficiency and information efficiency. Once a court becomes concerned with value efficiency, plaintiffs are in a difficult position, because IPO markets rarely approximate value efficiency.
The second problem is the courts' underestimation of the vigor of IPO markets. In fact, shareholders of many large corporations may rely on underwriters and the IPO process to act as independent judges of the progress and performance of the corporations' managers. 7 ' Moreover, when a corporation's securities are already traded in an active secondary market, the basic characteristics of information efficiency-low transaction costs and numerous similarly situated investors-may often also be met for the IPOs of similar securities of the same corporation. 2 In the case of smaller IPOs, the elements of an active market remain: multiple parties, arm's length bargaining, and a profit motive. Underwriters play a key role in creating this environment. 7 3 Although the market for an IPO may be less efficient than a large secondary market in responding to new information, it will not price securities without regard to such information. 4 As a result of the courts' overly rigorous requirements for information efficiency in IPO fraud on the market cases, most courts do not recognize an ordinary investor's reasonable reliance on an IPO market price to reflect sufficiently material public information. As a result, IPO plaintiffs are forced to establish their fraud on the market claims under the arbitrary, conceptually unappealing, and severe standards of Shores and T.J. Raney, as the courts have interpreted these cases. The sufficient efficiency approach, discussed below in Section III, would alleviate many of these problems.
III. A SUFFICIENT EFFICIENCY APPROACH TO FRAUD ON THE MARKET IN IPOs
This Section outlines and defends an approach to the fraud on the market theory in the IPO context that reconciles the good intentions of the Shores and T.J. Raney courts with the realities of financial markets. First, the Section explains how most investors reasonably rely on professionals to process relevant information and generate unbiased market prices for securities. Second, the Section discusses why many IPO markets are sufficiently information efficient due to the activity of underwriters and other professionals. Third, the Section explains how the sufficient efficiency approach is consistent with the purposes of the securities laws. Finally, the Section applies the sufficient efficiency approach to a number of prior cases.
A. A Conceptual Framework
A critical inquiry in a Rule 10b-5 case is whether the plaintiffinvestor reasonably relied on the market to incorporate all significant public information into the price of a security. An approach to this question that is based on sufficient information efficiency, rather than on value efficiency, would eliminate much of the judicial confusion and inconsistency surrounding the issue, and would further the policies and purposes of securities regulation. Two basic financial concepts which underlie the sufficient efficiency approach are the market model of investment behavior and unbiased price estimation.
The market model of investor behavior shows that an ordinary investor may reasonably rely on a class of professional investors to analyze new information and to seek arbitrage profits by trading securities. 7 These professional investors force the market price to reflect the latest public information concerning the security. The unbiased estimate model asserts that while the price produced by 75 MacKerron, 69 Or L Rev at 194-95 (cited in note 31). the activities of the professional investors may not be value efficient, it will not systematically err in one direction.7 6 This Comment argues that the interplay of these two models suggests that an ordinary investor's reliance on the market price is reasonable if the market is sufficiently information efficient. It further argues that the market will possess "sufficient efficiency" when there exists a class of professional investors whose activities result in the incorporation of all material public information about a security into a competitive market price.
1. Investor reliance on a sufficiently efficient market: the market model of investor behavior.
The market model of investor behavior posits two classes of investors. The first is a group of market professionals whose job it is to seek out new information and evaluate its effects on the price of securities. The incentive for these analysts is the arbitrage profit they may claim before the security's price adjusts to the new information." 7 The second group is made up of ordinary investors, individuals who lack the time, resources, or expertise to evaluate all the information concerning a security. Without becoming professionals themselves, ordinary investors will be unable to act in time to take advantage of opportunities for arbitrage profits.
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This division of labor is perfectly sensible. Those with the desires and abilities to participate in the fast-paced, technical and financially-oriented world of the market analyst will play this role and receive commensurate rewards, while those with skills and desires in other areas will rely on the analysts to do market research for them. 79 Thus, the ordinary investor acts reasonably 76 Although a number of studies have concluded that securities may be systematically underpriced relative to the secondary market, this phenomenon, if true, does not disturb the relevance of the unbiased estimate analysis .to conclusions of this Comment. See notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
77 See notes 21-23 and accompanying text. This motivation helps to foster information efficiency. The difference between the courts' restrictive and narrow approach and this Comment's sufficiency approach to information efficiency is one of degree. The issue is how much faith one puts in the market process. The courts' rigorous technical analysis posits a relatively broad range of outcomes, in which near-perfect value and information efficiency exist in large markets and insufficient pricing rationality pervades small markets. In contrast, the sufficient efficiency approach is founded on the belief that large markets are not as efficient, and smaller markets are not as irrational, as courts seem to think. when she relies on the market price because it is more efficient for her to accept this price than to dedicate considerable personal resources to determining whether the price is fair. The market professionals have already made this evaluation and pushed the price to a level they believe is appropriate. As such, the market price does not necessarily reflect only the fundamental value of the security or only its expected future selling price; the price may reflect both these perceived values. 8 0 Nonetheless, the ordinary investor's reliance is still reasonable, since the market professionals' estimate will, on average, be unbiased."' 2. Security prices as an unbiased estimate of value.
Because securities prices may not accurately reflect either the underlying fundamental value or the future selling price of the security, changes in market prices will be imprecise even if the market is information efficient. The exact amount of the change is influenced by a number of factors." 2 At best, it can only be said that the market price is "unbiased." 8' 3 An unbiased estimate means that, while the market price of the security may not accurately reflect some appropriate price of the security, the amount and direction of any error in the price will be random. 4 As an example, assuming the price which would generate a return commensurate with the riskiness of the security is $100, the market price may be $120, or $80, or even $200, due to 10 See notes 19-31 and accompanying text. "I As the riskiness of an investment increases, its expected return must necessarily increase due to the risk averse nature of investors. See Brealey and Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance at 136-39 (cited in note 14). The price of a security, if theoretically perfect, will be such that the cash flows generated by the security, including any expected gain from its future sale, yield the appropriate return. As long as the price of the security reflects this unbiased estimate of its appropriate price, the return will be consistent, on average, with the riskiness of the security.
82 Three factors are: (1) the number of analysts involved in the market, (2) psychological factors unrelated to the cash flows, and (3) error in prior estimates as to the value of the stock. See notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
83 See, for example, Carney, 44 Bus Law at 1283 (cited in note 10) (claiming that the best one can say is that prices reflect an "unbiased consensus about future events"). Macey and his coauthors believe that the fundamental value is the value around which the market price will vary, see Macey, et al, 77 Va L Rev at 1023 (cited in note 10), while this Comment argues that expected future prices may also have an impact on market price. The ultimate argument that markets are not systematically biased, however, is unaffected by this difference.
" Carney, 44 Bus Law at 1283-84 (cited in note 10) (prices will be "unbiased," but only in those markets where market forces act with "relative speed on new information"). See notes 110-11 and accompanying text for discussion of why "relative speed" is relatively unimportant in the context of an IPO. differences in analysts' methodologies and to human inability to forecast the future. Nonetheless, over time (and over a large group of analysts), the average differences between the security's trading price and its appropriate price would be zero.
Unlike the rigorous ECMH-based approach to information efficiency used by most courts, the unbiased estimate theory simply posits that market prices react to new information. The reaction may be neither value efficient 5 nor highly information efficient." 6 Nevertheless, the unbiased estimate theory says with a high degree of confidence that, first, the market price will be affected by the new information, and second, the resulting price will not be systematically biased in either direction.
8 7 The remainder of this Comment is based on the argument that it is reasonable for the average investor to rely on markets that are sufficiently information efficient and unbiased, regardless of whether they are value efficient or highly information efficient in a strict ECMH sense.
B. Sufficient Efficiency and Unbiased Estimates in the IPO Context
An IPO market will often be sufficiently information efficient so that investors may reasonably rely on the market price. A lack of rigorous information efficiency in IPO markets would only result in greater price volatility, and as noted earlier this variability will not be systematically biased. A sufficient efficiency approach also helps advance one of the purposes of the securities laws: to create an informationally efficient market for securities.
Professionals in IPO markets.
a) The role of professionals in IPO markets. The presence of a group of independent market professionals is strong evidence that the market price is sufficiently information efficient. Thus, to determine whether an IPO market is sufficiently information efficient to warrant a Rule 10b-5 class action plaintiffs' reli-"I While the reaction will not necessarily be value efficient, one would expect the reaction often to be based on notions of fundamental value, such that the direction and amount of the reaction would at least reflect (albeit not fully) these notions. But see discussion of other possible factors at notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
"s That is, the reaction will not be instantaneous. Even in those markets that best mimic the theoretical ECMH market, the price adjustment will take at least five to ten minutes. Brealey and Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance at 287 n 10 (cited in note 14). ance thereon, a court should begin by asking for evidence of such market makers. This Section argues that such market professionals do exist in the IPO context and that investors are reasonable in relying upon the resulting market price.
In a routine IPO, particularly those of smaller companies, the volume of transactions, and the number of analysts, market makers, and arbitragers involved in the offering, will not create an extremely close approximation of an ECMH market."' Nonetheless, when an adequate number of interested market professionals become involved, the IPO market satisfactorily approximates the assumptions of the ECMH, ensuring that the market is sufficiently information efficient to generate reliable prices.
It is rare for a corporation to issue its securities directly to the public. Rather, underwriters are usually employed to handle the offering." The underwriter typically purchases the securities outright from the corporation and resells them to the public. 90 The issuer generally sells the security to the underwriters at a percentage discount from the expected price which the public will purchase the security, known as the "spread." This discount represents the underwriters' compensation. 91 Naturally then, underwriters will bargain with the issuer over the security's offering price: the underwriter will not want a price that is too high (making sales more difficult), and issuers will not want a price that is too low (reducing the capital influx).
9 2 The underwriter has a powerful incentive to price the issue so as to yield a fair return to the investor, for only in so doing will it be able to sell the offering completely. Notably, the final price for an IPO is almost always not set until the day before, or even the morning of, the offering. 9 3 In this way, the underwriter will have access to information almost up until the 90 This is known as the "firm commitment" structure. Another significant form of underwriting contract is the "best efforts" arrangement, in which the issuer bears the risk of loss arising from shares which do not sell. point when actual sales begin, 4 and can use this information to set a market clearing price. The underwriter's perception of the proper offering price will generally be driven by the expected price of an issue in the secondary market.
9 5 Indeed, underwriters perform many of the same tasks in setting an offering price as do analysts in evaluating the secondary market. The underwriter will typically analyze the price to earning ratios of similar companies, the issuer's expected growth, the risks of the business, managerial strength, and existing market conditions." A final motivating factor for selling securities at responsible prices is the underwriter's strong incentive to preserve its reputational capital by dealing only with legitimate issuers.
Some commentators have noted that underwriters may have an incentive to underprice slightly the security relative to its ex-" A number of commentators have asserted that the involvement of underwriters does not create a "market" for IPOs. See MacKerron, 69 Or L Rev at 206 (cited in note 31); Carney, 44 Bus Law at 1291 (cited in note 10); Comment, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, A Contrarian View, 38 Emory L J 1269 (1989). However, this line of analysis is flawed in that it misconstrues the nature of the securities "market." The market is not some impersonal, undefined force but rather the result of the work of market professionals in evaluating information and adjusting the market price correspondingly. This type of evaluation and adjustment is precisely what underwriters do. Moreover, the underwriters have strong incentives to act rationally, since their reputations and funds are often ultimately at risk. See Easterbrook, 74 Am Econ Rev at 654 (cited in note 71) (arguing that the involvement of underwriters sends a valuable signal to investors).
" Bloomenthal, 1 Going Public § 1.02 at 1-5 (cited in note 90). Importantly, most underwriters do not want to play the role of the long-term investor. Rather, their main concern is with selling out the issue; their goal is to set the price which will generate this level of sales. Note that if the market makers are privy to the truth regarding a misrepresentation, the issuer may assert a defense in a Rule 10b-5 suit. Basic, 485 US at 248-49. This conclusion makes perfect sense. If the market makers know the truth, the prices will reflect the truth and plaintiffs will have no basis to recover. , 1984) ("Underwriters examine a company and its prospects in much the same way that an investor would, but much more intensively."). See also Bloomenthal, 1 Going Public § 2.02 at 2-15 (cited in note 90) (underwriters conduct an extensive investigation as part of their evaluation of a new issue).
,7 Easterbrook and Fischel, 70 Va L Rev at 688-89 (cited in note 79); Brealey and Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance at 337 (cited in note 14); Carney, 44 Bus Law at 1288 (cited in note 10). The extent to which unsavory characters still operate in the underwriting market may be the result of underenforcement of the antifraud provisions of securities regulation. This only strengthens this Comment's general call for a return to the purposes of the securities laws. See notes 106-07 and the accompanying text for discussion of the impact of unscrupulous underwriters on the presumption of reliance. pected price in the secondary market. 9 8 Underwriters may do this for a variety of reasons: to minimize their own risks, 9 " because requested to do so by the issuer, 1 0 0 or to help stimulate secondary market interest in the issue. 101 This may also be necessary to ensure an adequate return to the "ordinary" investor. 102 Accepting arguendo that underpricing occurs, plaintiffs can hardly be said to be acting unreasonably in relying on the price due to a possible underpricing. Buying underpriced securities is eminently reasonable.
b) Factors indicating a sufficiently efficient market. In the IPO context, a number of factors will indicate whether a group of market professionals exists' whose activities will create a sufficiently information efficient market. The factors include: (1) the issuance of a significant volume of securities; (2) a large number of potential investors; (3) participation by professional investors outside of the IPO (such as pension fund managers or brokerage firms); and most critically, (4) the direct involvement of an impartial, reputable underwriter in the offering. 10 3 For example, the involvement of a moderately sized brokerage house would indicate that at least one set of professionals is monitoring the security. Similarly, it is likely that a number of other professional investors 99 See table summarizing studies showing abnormal returns in Jay T. Brandi, Merit Securities Regulation, Market Efficiency, and New Issue Stock Performance, 12 J Corp L 699, 699-700 (1987 10' These factors are similar in some respects to the ones courts have identified as characteristic of highly information efficient ECMH markets. See notes 14-18 and accompanying text. However, this Comment proposes using these factors liberally in determining the existence of a class of professional investors. Courts have used analogous factors stringently in deciding whether a market closely approximates a highly efficient ECMH market. The courts attempt to define the perfectly information efficient market, whereas this Comment attempts to define the sufficiently information efficient market in which it is reasonable to presume reliance. will be interested in the issue if it is of any substantial size.
104 Evidence of such factors would support a presumption that the plaintiff class reasonably relied on an IPO market as being sufficiently information efficient to produce an unbiased market price for the security. Such reasonable reliance, in turn, should satisfy Basic's fraud on the market requirements for class certification. 105 c) When market professionals participate in or are aware of the misrepresentation. "Any showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price received (or paid) by the plaintiff or his decision to trade at a fair market price should be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance." 10 6 Specifically, defendants can rebut the presumption if they can demonstrate that underwriters were entangled in the web of fraud, or otherwise aware of material misrepresentations. Such an entanglement (or mere awareness) would effectively create a market unable to generate unbiased prices and unwilling to react to unfavorable information, and undercut the validity of presuming reliance on the resulting market price. As the Supreme Court noted, if "the 'market makers' were privy to the truth about the [fraud], and thus [] the market price would not have been affected by [the] misrepresentations, the causal connection could be broken.' 07 The presumption of reliance is just that-a presumption based on the reasonable expectations of investors that a market will be sufficiently information efficient to produce unbiased prices. If the actual market fails to meet these expectations, then the defendants may rebut the presumption.
"I A substantial offering would be in excess of say, ten million dollars. In addition, the close involvement of a regional underwriter should lend sufficient expertise. Underwriters often specialize in particular types of issues, so that a regional firm may have as much or more expertise in evaluating a relatively small municipal bond issue as would a large, national firm which deals nearly exclusively in the IPOs of Fortune 500 companies. See Bloomenthal, 1A Going Public § 8.02[1] at 8-9 (cited in note 90) (describing three tiers of underwriters, each with its respective specialties). Rev 923, 954-55 (1988) . This Comment, though it asserts that presumptive reliance should be easier to establish, does not advocate eliminating the reliance element altogether, and continues to afford defendants an opportunity to rebut the presumption on the facts of each case.
107 Basic, 485 US at 248.
2. The variability of market price in an initial public offering.
Unbiased estimate analysis supports the assertion that prices in smaller markets like the one for IPOs, that are not information efficient in a strict ECMH sense, may still reflect all material public information about a security. 0 8 The major difference between markets for IPOs and larger, more developed markets is that the trading price of an IPO will vary more from its appropriate level. In general, fewer analysts act to incorporate relevant information into the price of an IPO than into the price of a security trading in an extremely active secondary market. The resulting additional price volatility is analogous to a firm-specific risk that investors can eliminate through diversification. 109 Notably, this type of risk exists in all capital markets. Its more evident presence in IPO markets is not in of itself a proper basis for denying to IPO plaintiffs the protection from fraud the courts have granted to holders of Fortune 500 securities. Moreover, the reaction of a price to new information does not have to be instantaneous for a market to be sufficiently information efficient, such that reasonable investor reliance is warranted." l 0 A time lag merely represents an additional risk. A plaintiff may be acting quite reasonably in deciding to accept that risk, particularly since the final price for an issue is typically set within a day of the actual offering,:"' when the underwriter is watching the issue most carefully.
The greater price variability associated with IPO markets will affect the court's analysis of materiality" 2 and damages, alleviating concerns that a sufficient efficiency approach will allow too many Rule 10b-5 class actions to succeed. Judicial analysis must take into account the increased volatility inherent in a relatively small issue of securities in considering the materiality issue." 13 14) . 110 The time that it takes the market to respond to the new information will not only have an effect on the plaintiff's chances of winning a Rule 10b-5 claim, but it will also influence the amount recoverable in damages. See notes 114-19 and accompanying text.
See note 93 and accompanying text. 1'2 Materiality is another element of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action. Basic, 485 US at 231-32. 22 Macey, et al, 77 Va L Rev at 1045 (cited in note 10). If a security is traded in a secondary market, courts may use the evidence generated by an event study to estimate both materiality and damages. Event studies statistically isolate and measure a security price's reaction to a single event, taking into account the volatility of the applicable market. Id at 1028-30. In this way, these studies assess simultaneously both the materiality and the range over which prices may vary (that is, the less efficient the market), the greater the relative impact that a fraudulent statement must have in order to be considered material. This reasoning helps to ensure that defendants will not be liable for mere volatility in the price of risky IPO securities, which would exist independent of any misrepresentation.
The greater volatility in most IPO markets also makes the measurement of damages in Rule 10b-5 cases more difficult. The correct way of measuring damages in such cases is an unsettled issue. 11 4 Courts usually adopt one of two approaches. The controversial "rescission" approach allows the plaintiff to recover her entire purchase price. 1 1 5 Under this approach, the measurement of damages is simple. 11 6 However, if the court uses the more conventional "out of pocket" method, damages are equal to "the difference between the fair value of all the [plaintiffs] received and the fair value of what [they] would have received had there been no fraudulent conduct.' ' 1 7 Obviously, this approach is the more difficult to employ in that the price a plaintiff would have received is hypothetical. To calculate this hypothetical amount, some courts look at how market price reacted when the fraud was revealed, and measure damages based on the difference between the pre-and post-information trading prices. 1 8 Of course, difficulty remains in using the effect of information at one time to predict the effect if the information had been revealed earlier. Alternatively, the court may require evidence of the pricing of similar securities. Although either of these two approaches could easily turn into a battle of the experts, the hardly unique need for expert testimony should not preclude adoption of the sufficient efficiency approach. Importantly, in those cases where the defendants' behavior is egregious, reliance elements. For a variety of technical reasons, such studies may not be feasible in the context of an IPO. Event studies typically analyze a security's performance over a length of time encompassing the date on which the key event (for our purposes the misrepresentation) takes place. Id at 1030-31. Obviously, in the case of an IPO, analysis of prices prior to issuance is impossible. Nevertheless, the types of information used in these studies may guide a related analysis in the IPO context. 3. The sufficient efficiency approach and the purposes of securities regulation.
The sufficient efficiency approach serves the purposes and policies of securities regulation that the Supreme Court has identified. Securities legislation and regulations are, in large part, intended to prevent fraud as well as to ensure "fair and orderly" markets for securities. 20 Courts should construe actions under the Securities Act of 1934 "flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.' 12 ' Moreover, the Supreme Court has concluded that " [d] efrauded investors are among the very individuals Congress sought to protect by the securities laws.' 1 22 Defrauded, rational investors are those to whom the sufficient efficiency approach would extend additional protection.
Congress also hoped to encourage "the highest ethical standards . . . in every facet of the securities industry."' 23 Congress thought this necessary to ensure public confidence in markets. 1 24 The sufficient efficiency approach will also help to advance these goals.
Congress established corporate financial disclosure requirements as important mechanisms for meeting the antifraud and ethical goals of the securities laws, and for ensuring that the markets were more information efficient. 2 5 The issuer of an IPO has a 119 See examples of factual patterns at notes 55-68 and accompanying text. In dramatic instances of fraud, plaintiffs should have no difficulty establishing the impact of the misrepresentations since the value of the security if the fraud had been disclosed would presumably have been close to zero. 125 See Basic, 485 US at 246 ("Congress expressly relied on the premise that securities markets are affected by information, and enacted legislation to facilitate an investor's reliance on the integrity of those markets."); Blue Chip Stamps, 421 US at 728 (noting that one purpose of full disclosure is to prevent fraud). See also Capital Gains, 375 US at 186 (arguing that Congress intended to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for one of caveat duty to disclose important information to potential investors. 126 Disclosure essentially lowers the analyst's cost of obtaining the information, and thus helps to ensure that the issuing price better reflects the true financial condition of the issuer. 1 2 7
Mandatory disclosure, however, has little bite if the only time its violation is readily sanctionable is in those large markets where prices instantly and precisely reflect public information. 12 8 In fact, such a philosophy is somewhat perverse. In well developed markets, analysts have a greater incentive to ferret out the truth when corporations violate the full disclosure standards than they do in less developed markets. 2 9 This is because major issues are traded on well developed markets in high volume, and analysts can reap larger arbitrage profits from major issues as compared to the relatively minor issues traded in less developed markets. Since the potential benefits are greater, an analyst will be more willing to incur higher costs in determining whether a public statement (or lack thereof) concerning a large issue is misleading. In smaller issues handled in less developed markets, regulations must be enforced more rigidly in order to compensate for the lower level of analyst investigation. SEC disclosure requirements further this objective by placing the burden of disclosure on the party for whom the costs of acquiring information are lowest, the issuer itself.
13 0 Effective enforcement of this policy is all the more critical in less developed markets.
In all of these cases, an independent, professional underwriter was involved in the IPO, and functioned (or could have functioned) to create a sufficiently information efficient market. 147 As in Freeman, when such market professionals are untainted by fraud, investors' reliance is undeniably reasonable. When the scruples of these professionals is in doubt, however, plaintiffs should not be able to recover under Rule 10b-5. Instead, their remedy lies in a cause of action more specifically tailored to the abuses of issuer and underwriter fraud.
148

CONCLUSION
Purchasers of securities from initial public offerings may often reasonably rely on the market to incorporate all significant public information into the issuance price. The price almost certainly will not reflect the security's fundamental value, but it will be unbiased. Asking whether the IPO market is sufficiently information efficient to warrant reliance on the market price avoids dependence on the overly rigorous approach to information efficiency that courts have applied. While the assumptions of the ECMH are not "realistic" in the IPO context, the IPO market often provides a "sufficiently good approximation" to justify investor reliance.
49
The sufficient efficiency approach also serves the remedial and informational purposes of securities regulation.
H7 See notes 103-05 and accompanying text for suggested criteria of a market upon which a plaintiff may reasonably rely.
148 As an alternative remedy, defrauded investors may be able to take action under Section 11 of the 1933 Securities Act. See Jennings and Marsh, Securities Regulation at 918-19, 933 (cited in note 89).
148 See text accompanying note 1.
